



A COMPARISON OF KOMNENOS ERA BYZANTINE AND SONG ERA
CHINESE DIPLOMACY WITH NOMADIC NEIGHBORS
KOMNENOS DÖNEMİ BİZANS VE SONG DÖNEMİ ÇİN'İN GÖÇEBE
KOMŞULARI İLE DİPLOMASİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

KUBİLAY ATİK

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü
Assist. Prof. Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Faculty of Sciences and Letters, Department of History
kubilayatik@gmail.com

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7657-6645>

Atıf / Citation

Atik, K. 2021. "A Comparison of Komnenos Era Byzantine and Song Era Chinese Diplomacy with Nomadic Neighbors". *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi- Journal of Turkish Researches Institute*. 70, (Ocak- January 2021). 343-358

Makale Bilgisi / Article Information

Makale Türü-*Article Types* : Araştırma Makalesi-Research Article
Geliş Tarihi-*Received Date* : 14.7.2020
Kabul Tarihi-*Accepted Date* : 30.12.2020
Yayın Tarihi- *Date Published* : 20.01.2021
 : <http://dx.doi.org/10.14222/Turkiyat4433>

İntihal / Plagiarism

This article was checked by  iThenticate programında bu makale taranmıştır.



Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi- Journal of Turkish Researches Institute
TAED-70, Ocak-January 2021 Erzurum. ISSN 1300-9052 e-ISSN 2717-6851
www.turkiyatjournal.com
<http://dergipark.gov.tr/ataunitaed>

A COMPARISON OF KOMNENOS ERA BYZANTINE AND SONG ERA
CHINESE DIPLOMACY WITH NOMADIC NEIGHBORS
KOMNENOS DÖNEMİ BİZANS VE SONG DÖNEMİ ÇİN'İN GÖÇEBE
KOMŞULARI İLE DİPLOMASİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

KUBİLAY ATİK

Öz

Bu makale Asya'nın iki ucunda aşağı yukarı aynı dönemlere denk gelen bir zaman diliminde Bizans Komnenos Hanedanı ile Çin Song Hanedanının göçebe komşularına karşı güttüğü diplomasiyi karşılaştırmaktadır. Her iki imparatorluk da da çağlardır rakipleri olan göçebe komşularına karşı pek çok yönden benzer yaklaşım ve ideolojiler göstermekteydi. Ancak bu dönemde Komnenos hanedanı yönetimindeki Bizans İmparatorluğu daha önceki hanedanlardan ve Çin'deki Song hanedanının Kitan, Cürçen ve Tangut komşularına karşı güttüğünden farklı bir yaklaşım geliştirdi. Öte yandan Komnenos Hanedanı göçebe Türk komşularına karşı daha esnek bir diplomasiye sahipti ki bu sayede daha uzun ömürlü olabildi. Bu çalışma her iki hanedanın da yüzleştiği farklı siyasi ve askeri güçlükleri de göz önüne alarak bu iki hanedanın farklı yaklaşımlarını ele almaktadır. Song politikasının katılığı Bizans politikasının esnekliğiyle bu iki imparatorluğun ve göçebe komşularının karşılaştıkları ideolojik ve dini güçlüklerin ışığı altında karşılaştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Komnenos Hanedanı, Song Hanedanı, Bizans İmparatorluğu, Kitanlar, Cürçenler

Abstract

This paper compares the Byzantine and Chinese diplomacy towards their nomadic neighbors during the Komnenos Dynasty of Byzantine Empire and the Song Dynasty of China which roughly correspond to a similar time span on the two edges of Asia. Both empires were in many ways displaying similar attitudes and ideologies concerning their age-long nomadic rivals. However, during this period the Song dynasty displayed a different approach compared to the previous dynasties and the Byzantine Empire. The diplomacy of the Song Dynasty with its Khitan, Jurchen and Tangut neighbors differed from the previous dynasties. The Komnenos dynasty on the other hand, had a more flexible diplomacy with its Turkic nomadic neighbors which allowed it to survive longer. This study compares the two differing approaches of these dynasties to their nomadic neighbors taking into account the different political and military situations they faced. The reasons for the rigidity of Song policy vis-a-vis the flexibility of Byzantine policy is compared under the light of the ideological and religious challenges faced by these two empires and their nomadic neighbors.

Key Words: Komnenos Dynasty, Song Dynasty, Byzantine Empire, Khitans, Jurchens

Structured Abstract

The Byzantine Empire and Song Dynasty in China, though geographically apart from each other on the other edges of the Asian continent, faced similar problems in diplomacy during the period between the 11th-13th centuries. Their nomadic neighbors founded states that were radically different from the preceding nomadic states of the steppe area to their north. While the previous Türk and Uighur Qaghanates were content to follow the example of their Xiongnu and Rouran predecessors and settled on peace with China in return for trade rights and annual payments, and the states and confederations on the Qipchaq (Pontic) and Pannonian steppe beginning with the Huns of Atilla were mostly content with annual payments from both Roman Empires like their counterparts in the east, the new states established by Oghuz nomads in Anatolia and the Balkans, and by Khitans and Tanguts in North Eastern and North-Western China were radically different in their dealings with the Komneni in Byzantium and Song in China. The Seljuqs of Rum, the Tangut Xi Xia, Khitan Liao and later on Jurchen Jin states all had imperial claims on par with the Chinese and Byzantine claims. As a result, their titles, diplomatic protocols and demands as well as permanent occupation of Chinese and Byzantine territories created political tensions within these two empires. This article examines the reactions and the flexibility shown by these two empires towards the newly emerging nomadic empires on their doorsteps and the use of diplomacy by all parties for legitimacy, ideology and strategy when military means of these empires failed to protect them from their neighbors. In this respect, the different and similar reactions of the two empires is worth comparing. While there are many studies on the nomadic state formation, economic and political affairs between the nomadic and sedentary societies and states, the high medieval states established by nomads on the border areas of the nomadic-sedentary interaction are rarely studied not to mention compared.

The Komnenos Dynasty and the Song dynasty had different origins, and yet they were similar in many respects. Both were established by military men, both had the examples of the previous dynasties to surpass. This was not only a matter of personal dignity, but also a matter of legitimacy for these dynasties. Both states were despite the appearances, were fragile and divided politically in their respective courts. This in turn made diplomacy with the so-called barbarian neighbors and important avenue for legitimacy and inner politics. Within the Byzantine court, the factions were drawn on more articulate whereas within the Song, the lines were more blurred and mainly ideological. In this regard, the Song court resembled the modern governments more while the Byzantine court was in many ways split along ethnic, religious and class lines like the Tudor English court (Öğütçü 2019: 181). These differences in return created different environments of decision-making in foreign policy. Despite the appearance, the Byzantine and Chinese rulers were by no means absolute rulers, and decisions were made in their courts after deliberations among their courtiers who were divided through faction lines. While the Byzantine court had more rigidly separated factions, since these were interest groups rather than ideological factions, they could act more flexibly. The Song court on the other hand was divided along ideological lines, and although crossings of individuals along these factions was not rare, the factions as a whole were rigid in their political views and this made the Song decision-making process a more rigid one compared to the Komneni.

As a result, while the Komneni could cooperate with some of their nomadic neighbors against others (and even invite them to their inner political struggles, the Song courtiers dismissed their nomadic neighbors as barbarians altogether and stayed aloof from the realities on the battlefield, and imagined a world where neighbors of China accepted a Sino-centric cultural and ideological hegemony. Thus, despite the loss of very important territories to their nomadic neighbors, some factions in the Song court refused to accept superiority, or even the equality of their Khitan, Tangut and later on Jurchen neighbors in their diplomacy and foreign

policy, which in the end culminated in the underestimation of first the Jurchen power which resulted in the loss of Northern China, the heart of the Chinese civilization and the capital of the Song dynasty, and then the Mongols which resulted in the total annihilation of the Song dynasty. The Komneni on the other hand, despite the ideological discourse that can be seen in works such as The Alexiad written by a royal family member, did not hesitate to take their Turkic neighbors and later on their Mongol neighbors as practical partners in their foreign policy which prolonged the life-span of the empire despite the economic and military setbacks compared to the Song.

Introduction

The Byzantine Empire and the Song Dynasty of China faced similar problems against their newly emerging nomadic neighbors who were building their own empires and were intent on carving lands from their sedentary neighbors. While the lifespan of the Byzantine Empire might seem to be much longer than that of Song China, the history of the Byzantine Empire is also divided according to the ruling houses. The Komnenos dynasty (1081-1185) which is observed in this paper faced more or less similar problems as the Song Dynasty of China (960-1279). Both China and Rome were ruled by different dynasties at different times and every dynasty had an attitude of its own towards their neighbors. It should also be noted that both Empires faced threats from nomadic or semi-nomadic neighbors from the very early times onward. Therefore, the attacks from their neighbors were not the first of their kind. The main difference was that, both the late Byzantines and the Song were overcome on the battlefield by their nomadic neighbors who were more and more after their lands rather than plain plundering. The Byzantines initially faced the Arab threat that conquered their long time arch-enemy in Iran as well as very important Byzantine province in West Asia and North Africa (Arslan 2018: 47). Just as the Arab threat seemed to have cooled down, another threat arrived from the east, the Seljuq Turks who slowly began conquering the very heartland of the Byzantine Empire, Anatolia. In a similar manner, in China, the previous Tang Dynasty collapsed during the 9th century leaving its place to short-lived five dynasties in the northern plain of China and nine kingdoms in the south. But in a short while, the Song dynasty reunited them, and yet a small portion of the Chinese motherland in the north as well as the old Tang territories out of the China proper were lost to the Song forever after they faced defeats against the Khitans¹ in the northeast and the Tanguts² in the northwest. In this respect,

¹ Khitans are a people whose origins are still unknown today. They are among the oldest tribal federations seen in the Chinese sources but in time have been assimilated by the surrounding peoples. Their linguistic remains seem suggest that they belonged to a proto-Mongol linguistic group with heavy Tungusic borrowings or the opposite, a Tungusic speaking group with heavy Proto-Mongol and Turkic borrowings. After the collapse of the Tang dynasty they established a state for the first time in their history, and they named their state as Liao in Chinese after the Liao River which flows within their homeland in southern Manchuria. The Turkic pronunciation of their name Kitay came to be associated with Northern China and remains as the name of China in many Turkic and Slavic languages today, although the West European version Cathay later changed to China originating from the Qin dynasty. The Khitans developed one script called the large Khitan script based on Chinese script and another script called the small Khitans script based on the Uighur script. After the Mongol conquests, many Khitans served in the Mongol bureaucracy and army. They are important, because they were the first nomadic group to fully adopt Chinese and other sedentary concepts as well as statecraft and yet to retain their identity unlike for instance the Tuoba Wei and other such dynasties. For a more detailed account on the Khitans see: (Matsuo 1959)

losses of land for both the Byzantines and the Chinese had economic, but more importantly, psychological effects since the ruling dynasties claimed descent from much greater empires in geographic as well as economic and political aspects. However, it should be noted that unlike the gradual loss of Anatolia by the Byzantines to the Turks, the loss of the Northern China plain to the Jurchens³ and retreat to the south was rather unexpected and shocking for the Chinese. This was not the first shock since the Chinese emperors had to bow to the Khitan Emperors after military defeats and had to accept an inferior status as well as tribute payments to the Khitans. In addition, this created a greater internal strife within the ranks of political intelligentsia of Song China (Lin 2001: 78). Byzantines on the other hand also were defeated in the battle of Manzikert in 1071, and the Byzantine Emperor not only was defeated but also taken captive and had to make a treaty that greatly reduced the stature of the Byzantine Empire vis-à-vis the Seljuqs (Nicolle 2013: 27). But eventually, by the mid-12th century, both the Byzantines and Song faced similar conditions in the face of militarily stronger nomadic neighbors who were also adapting themselves to sedentary culture. In this respect, it is interesting to compare the attitudes and reactions of two empires who claim universal reign and being at the center of the civilized world to their newly emerging nomadic neighbors with ambitions of building their own empires.

With the comfort of knowledge at hand that both empires eventually fell to their enemies, the Song much earlier than the Byzantines, it is easy to criticize the decisions and the policies of the historical figures in these empires. Nevertheless, to their contemporaries, neither the Byzantine Empire nor the Song China was weak or doomed to fall eventually to their conquerors. Their rulers had Julius Caesar and Tang Taizong in front of their eyes as models to be followed, who united their empires and conquered many territories. At around the same time that Justinian was reconquering the Mediterranean lands, Song Taizong was reuniting China again conquering one kingdom after another in South China. In this respect, it was quite normal for their contemporaries to hope for a revival of their empires, when looked at in this light, the endeavors of the late Byzantine and Song rulers were not so unrealistic. It should also be noted that both the Byzantine Empire and the Song Empire resisted for a long time to the bitter end. In this respect, their dealings with their neighbors were not between

² Tanguts are a Tibeto-Burman language speaking people who came to the Ordos region as a result of pressure from the Tibetan Empire during the Tang period and claim descent from the Tuoba (Tabgach in the Turkic languages). After the collapse of the Tang dynasty, they established the Xi Xia state during the 9th century and this state was eventually annihilated by the Mongols. But until their collapse, the Tanguts played a crucial role in the East Asian politics. They developed their own writing system and left many culturally important heritages as can be seen in the Dunhuang caves. The Tangut name was used as a synonym for Tibet also throughout the medieval and early modern times. For further reading on the Tanguts: (Dunnell 1984)

³ Jurchens are the forefathers of the later Manchus who also established one of the greatest dynasties and also the last one in Chinese history. The Jurchens lived in the mountains and the forests of central and Northern Manchuria. Although some of them submitted to the Khitans after the establishment of the Liao dynasty, most of them remained out of control and they eventually conquered first the Khitan Liao Empire and then Northern China and established the Jin dynasty. Their dealings with the Tatar, Mongol and other Turkic tribes to their North and west set an example for the latter states. They also took their previous enemies, the Khitans as an example and not only continued but also developed many of the Khitan institutions in ruling over a vast sedentary and nomadic population. The Jin Empire was conquered by the Mongols after Jinghis Khans and his sons' campaigns. But they also gave many of their institutions to the Mongols as well as serving in their bureaucracy and army. For further reading see: (Franke and Chan 1997)

those of a superior nomadic power and an inferior sedentary country as is often depicted. For them they were, in the worst scenario, equals to their nomadic neighbors who now were also adopting their cultural and political norms. Yet, on the other hand, neither the Khitans and Jurchens, nor the Arabs or later the Seljuqs were completely uncivilized barbarians bereft of any knowledge about statecraft and interstate diplomacy. Although they heavily borrowed from their sedentary neighbors, they also evolved their own mechanisms of diplomacy, statecraft, and relations with their neighbors (Barfield 1992: 17). It was a time of gradual settling into sedentary life for these peoples in their respective areas. While we know today that the East Asian case is different from the East Mediterranean case, for the contemporary empires in these areas, the situation seemed more or less the same.

China & Byzantium: The Political Background

We should first begin with describing the situation in China and East Rome between the 11th and 13th centuries. A common phenomenon called the Islamic expansion hit both Tang China and the Byzantine Empire beginning from the 8th century onwards. However, this wave of political expansion by the Arabs was more heavily felt by the Byzantine Empire than by the Tang China. The only loss by the Tang China was that of the far western regions in central Asia after the battle of Talas⁴. The battle of Talas on the other hand, presumably only resulted in the ending of Chinese ambitions for westward expansion (Pan 1979: 59). The fact that the Tibetan Empire who fought both with the Abbasid Caliphate and the Tang China sporadically for dominance in Central Asia sided with the Abbasid Caliphate as well as the Karluk Turks who were also pressed between Arab expansion and Chinese dominance like other Turkic tribes in Central Asia shows that the Chinese were not necessarily in a defensive position, as can be seen in their previous help to the Ikhshidi rulers in Transoxiana just a few years earlier (Soucek and Soucek 2000: 68). Perhaps, had the Tang Dynasty not collapsed due to internal rebellions, the wars between the Abbasids and the Chinese would continue. But at this point the Tang had to deal with internal strife following the An Lushan rebellion⁵. The Byzantines, on the other hand, had been troubling with similar internal strife mainly between the political parties and religious parties which were intermingled with each other (Beihammer, Parani, and Schabel 2008: 37). As a result, rather than responding to the external threats, both empires were using their energies for quelling the internal rebellions and factional war. The Tang dynasty fell as a result of these rebellions and gave way first to five dynasties and ten kingdoms some of which were of Turkic origin and were patronized by the Khitans. In this respect, the conditions surrounding the establishment of the Song dynasty might seem different from the conditions surrounding the Byzantine Empire but at around the

⁴ Battle of Talas: The battle of Talas was fought in 751 between the Tang forces, their Karluk mercenaries and the Abbasid Caliphate and their Tibetan allies. The Karluk mercenaries switched sides during the war leaving the Tang troops alone against the united forces of the Abbasid Caliphate and the Tibetan Empire.

⁵ An Lushan rebellion (755-753) was one of the most devastating rebellions in Chinese history. It was started by An Lushan who was a general on the North Eastern border. An Lushan had a Turkic mother and a Sogdian father. He was trusted by emperor Xuanzong of the Tang dynasty, and raised from very humble origins in the army to military governorship. Even though his rebellion was consequently crushed, the Tang dynasty could never regain its strength again and soon collapsed. For further information about the An Lushan rebellion and An Lushan see: (Skaff 2000)

same time that the Turkic peoples who used to be commanders or governors in the Tang army established their own dynasties in the whole of Northern China plain. A similar process in a different way was also taking place within the Byzantine Empire with Macedonian and Armenian dynasties founded by army generals or governors (Maguire 1997: 49). But unlike China where the core of the problem was purely about gaining political power, in the Byzantine Empire, there was also a religious schism. Such a religious schism or struggle between supporters of religious groups did not take place in China until the late Song era⁶, and as can be seen for both the Chinese and the Byzantines, ethnicity did not matter too much as long as the ruler complied with the Chinese or Byzantine norms and values. This remained to be valid for the Byzantine Empire until the very end, whereas with the establishment of the Song dynasty, the Chinese gradually lost their flexibility to adopt the non-Chinese norms as well non-Han Chinese to the imperial service. Song Taizong united China under a single banner again after many battles and the last of the “alien” strongholds in Northern China, the Later Han Kingdom of the Shatuo Turks was incorporated into the Song Empire in 979. The Song regime also saw the Ordos region and the sixteen prefectures that were ceded to the Khitan Liao dynasty in Manchuria and Mongolia and the Tangut Xi Xia in the Ordos, Ningxia and Hexi (Gansu) regions as natural parts of the Chinese state and these claims continued to plague the internal and external policies of the state for the rest of its lifespan while the Byzantines were could be more realistic about what they could get and what they could not from their neighbors (Luttwak 2009: 97). Just a century before the battle of Manzikert, the Song dynasty was undertaking a similar enterprise for ridding the Chinese homeland off Khitans and Tanguts. For over a decade, the Chinese Song, the Khitan Liao and the Tangut Xi Xia states fought among each other to take lands and if possible to conquer the other. But after much fighting, the Song and Liao who became the main players in the East Asian political scene came to an agreement in 1007 after the Liao forces invaded parts of China but then were stopped by the newly crowned Song Emperor Zhenzong (Jiajing and Linrong 2014: 78). They came to a similar agreement that was to be repeated also between the Byzantines and their neighbors later on. The Song side bought off peace by paying annual tribute to the Liao dynasty and accepting equality with the Khitan Emperor (Shi 2012: 29). The Chanyuan treaty signed in 1004 became a guiding line for the Xi Xia state as well as the Jin state which would annihilate the Liao state later (Cheng 1997: 7). In fact, the 11th and the 12th centuries can be seen as the age of treaties in East Asia since the peace treaties between the states would continue until one of the parties would be annihilated by another state (Yun 2011: 72). The Song later also gave economic concessions such as trade rights and annual payments but not tribute to the Xi Xia state. The Tangut rulers were not as strong as the Khitans and they could not have the Song emperor to recognize them as emperors and equals (Dunnell 1994: 159). The longevity of the treaties in East Asia was one major difference with West Asia. The treaties between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuqs, or the Bulgars were

⁶ In the Song case, the events that led to parties supporting different ideas was caused by the appearance of Neo-Confucianism, an ideology rather than a religious system that became influential not only within the Song court but also became the state ideologies of Korea and Japan until the Modern era. For a more detailed account see: Kubilay Atik, “Japonya, Kapalı Ülke, İdeoloji ve Din,” *Doğu-Batı*, no. 60 (May 2012); Kubilay Atik, “Kore Aydınlanması: Joseon Dönemi,” *Doğu Batı*, no. 61 (August 2012).

valid only during the lifetimes of the rulers who signed them and had to be renewed when one of the rulers died, or the treaties became invalid. For instance, after the battle of Manzikert was fought, the Seljuq and Byzantine emperors signed a treaty which stipulated that the Byzantine emperor would pay a single time payment of over one million gold as well as annual payments and some land (Comnena 2000: 37–42). But he was dethroned even before arriving to the capital and the treaty was invalid immediately which led to further military confrontation ending in loss of territory for the Byzantines in the Anatolian peninsula. When looked at under this light it is easy to condemn the Byzantine policy as unsuccessful since clinging to the treaties helped to maintain fixed borders and prevent loss of territory for the Song whereas the Byzantines continuously lost territories in Anatolia and the Balkans. But it should be noted that the Khitans remained within their homeland and even in the sixteen prefectures that they permanently invaded, there was not a large settlement by the Khitans and the population remained to be predominantly Han Chinese. In the case of the Balkans and Anatolia, there was a continuous influx of peoples. While the Slavs who initially settled in the Balkans were later incorporated into the empire, the Bulgar kingdom and later the Anatolian Seljuq Sultanate permanently settled within the Byzantine heartlands in Anatolia and the Balkans with large populations that in time assimilated the local Greek speaking Byzantine population unlike the Khitans who were Sinicized in time. Especially in Anatolia, even during times of peace there was a continuous influx of Turkmen tribes who could not be controlled even by the Seljuq Sultans.

Policies of the Song & Komneni

These main differences set the stage for different policies adopted by these two states. While the previous dynasties in Rome and China seem to have more similar policies towards their nomadic or semi-nomadic neighbors such as divide and conquer, or loose reigns policies, the Song and Komnenos dynasties seem to go on different directions. While the Song policies seem to be more stable and longer lasting, the Byzantine policies seem to be short-lived and more inconsistent. But as stated above, the appearance can be deceiving. First of all, the Song policy was a derivation from centuries old Chinese policies towards the northern borders of China. As mentioned above, the situation in Anatolia and the Balkans was much more volatile than the Northern borders of China seemed to be for the Chinese. Since the Khitans and the Tanguts established states in a Chinese fashion, the Song could, albeit grudgingly, take the words of these “uncles and nephews”⁷ as granted in keeping peace on their borders. This seeming stability on the other hand caused the Song to isolate itself and concentrate on the inner politics unlike the Tang dynasty before them who would be

⁷In the East Asian but mainly Chinese and nomadic norm of diplomacy, the sides belonged to a fictive family. The stronger side would become the elder brother, uncle or even a father in accordance with his power and status compared to the weaker party. This tradition is thought to come from the Türks who would adopt sons or nephews from among their allies not only through marriage bonds but also through creating a fictive family bond by adopting them to the family by giving them their family name which was later adopted by the Tang dynasty as well. We see an early example of this type of political alliance during the three kingdoms era in the case of Lu Bu, who was of Qiang origin and was taken as an adopted son by consecutive generals as can be seen in Sanguozhi. For an explanation of nomadic form see: (Skaff 2012: 203–38)

interested in all the developments happening not only within its borders but all the way to the Caspian sea and Siberia. As a result the previous Tang dynasty could foresee the developments outside of their borders and could take precautions such as supporting the Kök Türks against the rising Tardush tribes after the collapse of the second Kök Türk Empire or such as allying with the Turks or sometimes the Tibetans against the advancing Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia (Skaff 2012). Byzantines also had a similar policy although now at a reduced scale to Western Asia and parts of Europe. In this respect, when we compare the policy making decisions of the Song and Komnenos dynasties, we see that the Song would react to the danger only after it arrived while the Byzantines reacted more flexibly. They could ally with the Hungarians against the Bulgars or with the Egyptians against the Seljuqs, or with the Seljuqs against the Mongols or other Turkic groups. Another difference was that the Song did not lose large portions of its economic, political and cultural heartland. The sixteen prefectures were at best marginal borderlands important only for their strategic value in defending Northern China or attacking Manchuria. Even when the Song lost the Northern China plain which is the political and cultural homeland of the Chinese, the Southern parts that they retained were economically far more productive and had a much larger population which had commercial ties with South East Asian states and West Asia for centuries which brought a great revenue to the state (Atik 2020: 87). This was why they could afford to isolate themselves and remain aloof of the developments in the steppe such as the rise of first the Jurchens later the Mongols both of which had eventually deadly blows to the Song. In fact, even when the Song attempted at alliances against its enemies with other nomads as in the case of its alliance with the Jurchens first against the Khitans when it lost Northern China to the Jurchens and secondly in the case of alliance against the Jurchens with the Mongols which resulted in the total conquest of the dynasty by the Mongols, the Song policy makers were inconsistent and this resulted in great losses. The Byzantines on the other hand, were more adept at the more volatile situations and could even force their Seljuq or Bulgar neighbors to submit to them when they made alliances with the neighbor of the Seljuqs or the Bulgars (Luttwak 2009: 79). Manuel Komnenos I allied with the Danishmend and other neighbors of the Seljuqids. In fact, as a result of this alliance, the Byzantines had the Seljuqs submit to them and make a peace treaty without having to fight a large scale war themselves (Ayönü 2014: 148–55). In the same manner, the Byzantines managed to use the enmities between the Bulgars, Hungarians and other tribes such as the Kumans and Pechenegs to their own advantage in the Balkans. As a result of these clever diplomatic maneuvers the exhausted Byzantine armies and treasury in distress. Compared to the Song, the Komnenos era Byzantine Empire lacked both the human and material sources that it had previously as a result of loss of Anatolia and large parts of the Balkan peninsula. Thus, the Song could rely on an army sometimes amounting to a million soldiers albeit very bulky and not as effective as the armies of its neighbors to the North. The Byzantines on the other hand would neglect the military system and rely on mercenaries as suggested by Ayönü (Ayönü 2014: 157), and did not give as much importance to their eastern borders as they should in times of crisis in the Balkans whenever the Cumans or the Bulgars would attack their borders. In this respect, it could be said that the Song was more successful in defending its borders with military might compared to the Byzantines. Even after they lost their homeland in the north, they stood for more than a century against first the Jurchens who conquered all of Mongolia and ended the

mighty Khitan Liao dynasty as well as taking the Northern China plain from the Song. They set the Huai River as the fixed border between the two states and later the Song continued to uphold this border against sporadic attacks by the Jurchens until the Mongols arrived into the scene sweeping across the North China plain (Atik 2016: 27). The Song initially made a pact with the Mongols and attacked the Jurchen forces, but later emboldened with the easy fall of the Jurchen dynasty, they turned their eyes on Northern China to take back their lands. As a result a war began between the Song and the Mongols until the dynasty fell after more than four decades of fighting. Even if the Song was eventually vanquished, it should be remembered that the Song military was the longest standing army against a full-fledged Mongol attack. Although the Komnenos dynasty also experienced many military onslaughts none of them except the 4th crusade which brought about its collapse within a relatively short time were as strong as the Jurchen or Mongol attacks.

The Byzantine Empire on the other hand had to deal with their neighbors trying to encroach on their lands with larger armies. In this respect, the Komnenos dynasty had to rely on politics more than the Song dynasty, and so it did. In order to understand the success of the Byzantine diplomacy one only needs to compare it with its contemporaries such as the Song China, the Kharazmians, and the Seljuqs of Rum all of which had stronger armies but could not stand the onslaught of the Mongols due to their inability to deal diplomatically with an enemy with a much stronger army. In this respect, the Byzantine diplomatic maneuvers were more cleverly applied compared to its contemporaries during the Komnenos dynasty. Even after crushing defeats on the battlefield like Manzikert or Myriakaphelon, the Byzantines managed to deal with the situation with a more realistic approach. It could be claimed that the Byzantines could be more flexible in their approach to the changing situations around them and could adopt more realistic policies unlike the Song China. This on the other hand is not due to a break from the traditional worldview that the Byzantine Empire is the center of civilization like the Chinese empire. To the contrary, the classical Byzantine and Chinese models never foresaw an isolation policy. While the Song saw the treaties with the Khitans, Tanguts or the Jurchens as inglorious and humiliating, and as a result the Song court elite more and more turned into themselves remaining aloof of the realities especially after the dominance of neo-Confucians among the intelligentsia and court circles, the Byzantine court became more and more aware of the situation and turned to classical tactics such as dividing the enemy lines, bribing the Kumans against the Pechenegs, or even using the Crusaders against the Seljuqs in Anatolia. These had never been new policies invented by the Komnenos rulers of the Byzantine Empire. The Song on the other hand, by remaining not only militarily but also politically limited to its borders in a way gave up its claim to be a universal Empire no matter how much its ideologists claimed the opposite. Thus, the tenacity with which the Byzantines remained to exist despite greater odds can be understood in the realistic and clever diplomatic moves despite military weaknesses.

But one also needs to examine the neighbors of these two empires to better understand the situation. After the collapse of first the second Kök Türk Khanate and later the Uighur Khanate, a power vacuum occurred in the steppes of East Asia. The Khitans who had long been vassals of the Kök Türks and later the Uighurs took advantage of the situation after the Tang dynasty, the last standing great power in the region fell victim to internal strife beginning with An Lushan rebellion. But it should be noted that it was not only the internal

strife within China that allowed the Khitans to dominate the region. The Khitans had been undergoing social and political changes. They were rather less developed compared to the Türks or the latter Uighur Khanates in terms of political and military organization. They had never been united in consecutive generations throughout their history. They would be united whenever there was an external threat that jeopardized their existence as a whole or whenever there was a charismatic leader who promised successful campaigns towards their neighbors. During the 10th century, the Yelü clan began to unite the Khitan tribes. Before Yelü Aboji who united the Khitans under his strong leadership made the succession hereditary within the Yelü house, it was customary for the Khitans to choose the new leader in a Qurultai. Every chieftain in theory could compete for becoming the Khan. Yelü Aboji continued to consolidate his power by conquering the Shiwei clan in Southern Manchuria on the Liao river basin. Next, Yelü Aboji conquered the Balhae Kingdom which became a turning point. Until that point, the Khitans had a primitive economy based on a semi-nomadic lifestyle. But the Balhae Kingdom, which was the descendant of the Goguryeo Kingdom had a very developed administrative system and civic life as a sedentary economy and ties with Korea, Japan and China, the main centers of sedentary culture in East Asia. In fact, at that point the Balhae Kingdom was developed enough to influence Japan culturally and politically (Tamura 2008: 98). As a result of this, the elite of the Balhae Kingdom was incorporated into the Khitan administrative system. Although the Kök Türks and the Uighurs also had some cities under their jurisdiction before, the Khitan case was different. With the addition of the sixteen Chinese provinces the largest of which was Yanzhou, near modern day Beijing, the sedentary population under Khitan rule was larger than the nomadic population. But the areas settled by the Balhae people and Chinese people remained separated from the areas settled by the nomads. This was a time of social change for East Asia, the Uighurs were also settling into the cities and changing into sedentary people from a nomadic one in the west, while the Tanguts were also having a similar process to the Khitans. The Kök Türks and the Uighurs before them did not attempt to conquer sedentary Chinese territory before as mentioned above. The reasons are explained by Tonyukuk in the Orhon inscriptions as well as in other Chinese documents prepared by the nomads. The Khitans were also aware that they themselves did not know how to govern the sedentary areas, so they created a dual administrative system, and did not go further in conquering more Chinese or Korean territories after they failed two attempts in China and even gave some territory to the newly established Goryeo kingdom in Korea. In the south they created an administration which was based on Korean models in Manchuria and Chinese models in the sixteen provinces captured from the Chinese. But they were more interested in expanding towards the steppe. The nomads still remained to be their main economic and human resource for warfare and trade. They took the system of multiple capitals from the Balhae kingdom, which facilitated the administration of a geographically vast terrain with different ethnicities, cultures and economies. The eastern capital was responsible for the administration of the Balhae people, the western capital was responsible for the Mongolian steppes and the nomads therein, the northern capital was responsible for the administration of the forest tribes living in the river basins and forests of Manchuria as hunters and farmers to a certain extent. The central capital was in the Liao region at the homeland of the Khitans and was the center of politics and administration of the royal court. There were many dynasties in Chinese history before the

Khitans who established themselves in China and became assimilated after a certain period of cultural and administrative Sinification⁸ which resulted in the disappearance of the nomadic traits from these people. The Khitans avoided this by remaining within their own territory and administering the sedentary areas through their sedentary peoples. The royal Yelü clan also adopted a marriage strategy which was later adopted by the Jurchens and the Mongols as well. The Xiao clan became the consort clan and the most loyal supporter of the Yelü royal house. All the Khitan Khans married with Xiao clan girls which also diminished the risk of gradual sinification of the royal house which is recorded in the Chinese chronicles related to the Kök Türk and other Turkic royal houses who married Chinese princesses and made the sons from these princesses Qaghans later on and even sent the sons to the Chinese court for education at times (Ouyang Xiu 2000: 6023–71; Liu Xu 1975: 5241–82). The Xiao clan in this respect provided brides who were both politically educated in a family deeply involved in politics and yet raised in the nomadic Khitan heartland in Manchuria in a traditional manner (Matsuo 1959: 73). But it should not be thought that the Khitans were total strangers to the sedentary people around them, they also took Chinese style education, in fact many of the Khitan princes were famous poets and painters even renowned in the Song court in China (Twitchett and Tietze 1994: 47). The Khitans had long been in touch with Chinese culture dating back to their days as vassals of the Kök Türks when their chieftains would go to the Chinese court as envoys or more often to the Chinese border cities for trade and tribute relations (Jiajing and Linrong 2014: 23–27). On the steppe, however, the Khitans retained their nomadic character but also extended the Tang system of jimi system⁹ or the loose reins system in its dealings with the nomadic tribes on the Mongolian steppes to their west (Standen 2007: 17). As a result of this dual system which was later on copied by the Jurchens and the Mongols, the nomadic Khitan Empire managed to be more stable and a durable enemy to the Song China in the south. But unlike the Seljuqs of Rum, the Khitans only sought economic benefit in their dealings with the Chinese rather than land. Despite all the social and organizational developments, the Khitans were still aware of their incapacity to rule a large sedentary territory (Lorge 2008: 63).

The Seljuq of Rum on the other hand also had a similar system. The Seljuqs of Rum and the other Seljuq vassal principalities in Anatolia found a land that was hosting a highly developed and sophisticated society with different ethnicity and religions. The Turkic population was mainly pastoral nomads while the Greek, Armenian, Arabic and other ethnicities were agricultural societies. Religion was another complicated matter which did not bother the Khitans, but created complications for the Seljuq Sultans. The Turks were a Muslim minority in a Christian land when they first arrived. And throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries this did not change. In fact, the Seljuq Turks themselves were comparatively

8 The Wei dynasty established by the Tabgach or Tuoba tribe was perhaps the most prominent among them. The Tabgach are thought to be of Turco-Mongol origin yet they deliberately assimilated themselves into Chinese culture so much that in the Orkhon inscriptions Tabgach name came to represent the Chinese.

9 Jimi system (羈縻制) was used by the Tang dynasty after the defeat of the First Türk Qaghanate in order to rule over the nomadic tribes in inner Asia. The chieftains of the tribes would be appointed to their own tribal areas as governors and the Tang administration would let them free in their local government affairs.

new converts to Islam compared to their Arabic or Persian subjects. Thus, the dual system was further emphasized by the difference not only in cultural, ethnic and economic differences but also in religion which played a major role in West Asia and Europe. The Khitans believed in native Khitan religion as well as Buddhism (Wang Xiaofu 2004: 47) which was used as a legitimizing element in their rule of sedentary Chinese and Manchurian peoples who were also Buddhists, but some Khitan and other nomadic tribes, especially the Turkic clans of Western Mongolia were also Nestorian Christians (Aida Niro 1982: 129). Therefore, religion did not play a major role in social life or the legal and administrative system in East Asian Empires. But the Seljuqs who converted into Islam a century or so ago legitimized their rule in Iran and West Asia through Islam. It was also Islam that justified their conquest of lands in Anatolia among their Turkic subjects who were migrating to Anatolia in increasing numbers. The role of Islam as a legitimizing factor was more so for the Seljuqs of Rum since they also lacked the legitimacy titles that the Great Seljuq Sultans possessed. In fact, until the collapse of the Great Seljuq Empire, the rulers in Anatolia did not have the right to use the title Sultan (Mecit 2013: 128). As a result, the nomads who were Muslims were loosely controlled by the Seljuq ruler of Anatolia while the ruler himself was living in cities, first in Iconium then in Nicea and ruling over his Christian and Muslim sedentary subjects more directly in a Persian administrative manner (Koca 2011: 179). One difference between the Seljuq Turks and the Khitans was that, while the Khitans had just been entering a sedentary territory, the Seljuqs had come to Anatolia through Central Asia and Iran both of which not only had a very long tradition of city life and sedentary culture, but also had large Turkish speaking populations who began settling in cities of Transaxonia and Khorasan even before the arrival of Islam to the area (Barthold 2010: 57). The Seljuqs in their military organization remained highly mobile in the Central Asian fashion while adopting Persian and Byzantine practices in the government structure (Turan 2012: 223). Unlike the Khitans, the Seljuqs did not see themselves under danger of cultural assimilation by the Greek population since there was a constant influx of Oghuz and other Turkic tribes into Anatolia, and secondly the role of Islam and Christianity as a barrier. In fact, the opposite happened in the Anatolian case, and the nomadic Turks in time assimilated the native population (Kafalı 1998: 23). Thus, the dealings of the Seljuqs of Rum were different from the Khitans. While the Khitans tried to rule the nomads who could pose a threat to them more directly and rule the sedentary Chinese and Balhae population more indirectly, the Seljuqs were ruling the cities and sedentary segment of the population more directly while it could not administer the nomadic Turkmen populations even when it wanted to (Ayönü 2014: 79). In fact, there were other Turkic principalities within Anatolia such as the Danishmends who could pose a greater threat than the Byzantines. As a result of multiple powers and a multi-state system, especially after the collapse of the Great Seljuq Empire, the situation in Anatolia and West Asia in general was more volatile (Ağırnaslı 2016: 247) unlike East Asia where the Khitans were dominating the political scene.

But these two different conditions created a similar result in the Sino-Khitan and Turco-Byzantine relations. Although the Byzantine sources and Chinese sources depict these nomadic people as barbarian hordes intent on destroying the civilized world and mode of life, this was mostly for inner consumption and the reality was much more different. As Songül Mecit indicates, neither the Seljuqs, nor the Byzantines were really intent on annihilating the

other, they chose a path of coexistence despite sporadic battles on the front lines, and they could become useful allies in times of crisis (Mecit 2013: 97). The Chinese case, though different, also yielded a similar result. The Khitans and the Jurchens were militarily stronger but did not have the organizational skills to administer the whole of China which stopped both sides from trying to exterminate the other altogether despite some wars on the front. Diplomacy became a key element in the interstate relations and the developments of this period laid the ground for the later Mongol Khanates who ruled much of Asia. This era of a multi-state system based on the equality of the parties in spite of the discourse seen in the Chinese or Byzantine sources continued until the arrival of the Mongols who annihilated the Song in the East and the Seljuqs of Rum in the west (Atik 2018: 17).

Conclusion

Although war was still an important element in the dealings of the Seljuqs with the Byzantines and the Steppe peoples of East Asia with China, norms of diplomacy developed further and gained more importance for the mutual survival of the polities in these regions beginning from the 10th century until the arrival of the Mongols in the 13th century. But even the Mongols adopted many of the diplomatic norms and novelties that began to take shape during this era. Despite the Byzantine and Chinese discourse of continuity in norms, this was a time of change in Chinese and Byzantine as well as Turkic and other nomadic societies in social, political and religious areas. Despite the sources depicting the Turks or the Khitans as unrefined barbarians inferior to the Byzantines or Chinese, the reality on the political scene was that the Byzantines and the Chinese were compromising and while the Byzantines were better at adapting themselves to the new realities, the Song empire was a victim to its later disability in adapting to the arrival of first the Jurchens and later to the Mongols due to rising chauvinism as a result of neo-Confucian movements within the intelligentsia and court circles. These movements, which began as a student movement among the university circles of the time in time gained the upper hand in the court and as a result became the state ideology whereas the Byzantine Empire did not hesitate to change its policies regardless of ideology or religion. In fact, in the Byzantine case ethnicity did not matter either since the Turks and other ethnicities could easily be employed by them as can be seen in the whole text of the *Alexiad* (Comnena 2000), and as can be seen in *De Administrando Imperio*, an Byzantine Chronicle of great importance about the early history of the Turks in the Balkans, suggests, the Byzantines had been using this strategy for a long time even before the Komnenos Dynasty.¹⁰ As Kurat suggests, the Byzantines were very adept at using the Pechenegs for their advantage against the other ethnicities and the Qipchaks against the Pechenegs and vice versa (Kurat 2016: 57).

¹⁰ For a Greek and English edition see: (Porphyrogenitus 1985)

Bibliography

- Aida N. (1982). *蒙古襲来の研究 [Môko Shûrai no Kenkyû: Research on the Mongol Invasions]*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan.
- Ağırnash, N. (2016). *Anadolu'nun Fethini Kolaylaştıran Faktörler*. Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi Sayı 39
- Arslan, B. (2018). Bizans Sarayında Endülüslü Bir Elçi: Şair Yahya El-Gazal ve Haberleri. *Cappadocia Journal of History and Social Sciences*. Vol. 11.
- Atik, K. (2012a). Japonya, Kapalı Ülke, İdeoloji ve Din. *Doğu-Batı*, 60.
- Atik, K. (2012b). Kore Aydınlanması: Joseon Dönemi. *Doğu Batı*, 61.
- Atik, K. (2016). *Çin Kaynaklarında Altınordu Hanlığı ve Cuçi Ulusu*. *Crimean Historical Review*
- Atik, K. (2018). *Court Politics in the Mongol Empire From Ögedei Until Möngke*. in: *Social Sciences Studies in Turkey*. Bloomington: Trafford Publishing.
- Atik, K. (2020). Orta Çağ Bozkır Devletlerinde Hayvancılık Üzerine Yasalar: Tangut Devleti Örneği. *Erzincan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 13(2), 183–198.
- Ayönü, Y. (2014). *Selçuklular ve Bizans*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Baker, G. P. (2002). *Justinian: The Last Roman Emperor*. New York: Cooper Square Press.
- Barfield, T. (1992). *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*. New York: Wiley.
- Barthold, V. V. (2010). *Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık*. Translated by Ahsen Batur. Tarih Dizisi 45. İstanbul: Selenge Yayınları.
- Beihammer, A. D., Maria G. P., and C. D. Schabel, eds. (2008). *Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000–1500*. The Medieval Mediterranean 74. Leiden: Brill.
- Cheng, Z. (1997). *使金錄 [Shijinlu: Mission to Jin]*. Xianshang: Qilu Shushe.
- Comnena, A. (2000). *The Alexiad*. Translated by Elizabeth A. S. Dawes. Byzantine Series. Ontario: In Parentheses Publications.
- Dunnell, R. W. (1984). “Who Are the Tanguts? Remarks on Tangut Ethnogenesis and the Ethnonym Tangut.” *Journal of Asian History* 18 (1): 78–89.
- Dunnell, Ruth W. (1994). “The Hsi Hsia.” In *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, edited by Denis C. Twitchett, Herbert Franke, and John King Fairbank. Vol. 6. Cambridge Histories. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fan, X. (2012). *宋太宗皇帝實錄校注 [Song Taizong Huangdi Shilu Jiaozhu: Annotated Version of the Veritable Records of Emperor Song Taizong]*. Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House.
- Franke, H., and Hok-Lam C. (1997). *Studies on the Jurchens and the Chin Dynasty*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Jiajing, Y., and Gui L. (2014). *契丹國志 [Qidan Guozhi: History of Khitans]*. 1st ed. 中国史学基本典籍丛刊 [Zhongguo Shixue Jiben Dianji Congkan: Basic Collections of Chinese Historiography]. Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House.

- Kafalı, M. (1998). *Anadolu'nun Fethi Ve Türkleşmesi*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı.
- Koca, S. (2011). *Selçuklu Devri Türk Tarihinin Temel Meseleleri*. Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi.
- Kurat, A. N. (2016). *Peçenekler*. Edited by Ahsen Batur. IV.A-1.1 26. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Lin, T. (2001). “宋辽‘澶渊之盟’- 古代少数民族与汉族长期和好的范例 [Song Liao Chanyuanzhi Meng- Gudai Shaoshu Minzu Yu Hanzu Changqi Hehao De Fanli: The Song-Liao Treaty of Chanyuan- the Premodern Treaties Relations between the Minorities and the Han Chinese].” *平原大学学报 [Journal of Pingyuan University]*, no. 4.
- Liu X., ed. (1975). *舊唐書 [Jiu Tangshu: The Old Book of Tang]*. 200 vols. 二十四史: The Twenty-Four Histories. Beijing: 中華書局: Zhonghua Publishing House.
- Lorge, P. (2008). “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border.” In *Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period*, edited by Don J. Wyatt, 59–74. The New Middle Ages. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luttwak, E. (2009). *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Maguire, H., ed. (1997). *Byzantine Court Culture from 829 to 1204*. Washington: Dumbarton Oaks.
- Matsuo, O. (1959). “契丹古代史の研究 [Kittan kodai shi no kenkyû: Research on Khitan Ancient History].” *東洋史研究叢刊 [Toyoshi Kenkyu Sokan]*, 東洋史研究 [Toyoshi Kenkyu]: Kyoto, , no. 6.
- Mecit, S. (2013). *The Rum Seljuqs: Evolution of a Dynasty*. Edited by Carole Hillenbrand. Songül Mecit, The Rum Seljuqs: Evolution of a Dynasty, Ed. Carole Hillenbrand, Routledge Studies in the History of Iran and Turkey. New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Nicolle, D. (2013). *Manzikert 1071: The Breaking of Byzantium*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Ouyang X., ed. (2000). *新唐書 [Xin Tangshu: The New Book of Tang]*. 10 vols. 二十四史: The Twenty-Four Histories. Beijing: 中華書局: Zhonghua Publishing House.
- Öğütçü, M. (2019). “Von Freunden Und Fraktionen: Die Historiendramen von Shakespeare.” *Hacettepe University Journal of Faculty of Letters* 36(1):179–187.
- Pan, H. (1979). *隋唐五代史綱 [Sui Tang Wudai Shiwang: An Outline of History of the Sui, Tang and Five Dynasties]*. Beijing: 人民出版社: Renmin Chubanshe.
- Porphyrogenitus, C. (1985). *De Administrando Imperio*. Edited by G.Y. Moravcsik and R.J.H. Jenkins. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae. Washington: Dumbarton Oaks.
- Shi, X. (2012). “西夏民族政策研究 [Xi Xia Minzu Zhengce Yanjiu].” PhD, Xibei Minzu Daxue.

- Siu, C. H. (1999). *Essentials of Neo-Confucianism: Eight Major Philosophers of the Song and Ming Periods*. Edited by Frank Hoffmann. Resources in East Asian Philosophy and Religion. Londra: Greenwood Press.
- Skaff, J. K. (2000). "Barbarians at the Gates? The Tang Frontier Military and the An Lushan Rebellion." *War & Society* 18 (2): 23–35.
- Skaff, J. K. (2012). *Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, and Connections, 580-800*. Oxford Studies in Early Empires 4. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soucek, B., and S. Soucek. (2000). *A History of Inner Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Standen, N. (2007). *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossings in Liao China*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Tamura, K. (2008). *동아시아의 도성과 발해 [Dong Asiaeui Doseongwa Balhae]*. Ostasiatische Stadtfestungen Und Balhae. Seoul: Tongbuga Yeoksa Jaedan.
- Turan, Refik, ed. (2012). *Selçuklu Tarihi El Kitabı*. Ankara: Grafiker Yayınları.
- Twitchett, D. C., and K. P. Tietze. (1994). "The Liao." In *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 710-1368*, edited by Denis C. Twitchett and Franke H. Fairbank. Vol. 6. Cambridge Histories. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Xiaofu, W. (2004). "契丹建国与回鹘文化 [Qidan Jianguo Yu Huihu Wenhua]." *Social Sciences In China* 4: 186–202.
- Yun, P. (2011). "Balance of Power in the 11th~ 12th Century East Asian Interstate Relations." *Journal of Political Criticism*, no. 9.